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Economic Perspective 3 
CLOSURES : SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT SOBSIDISE LOSS-MAKDC ENTERPRISES 
David Williams 
Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde 
The most powerful arguments against the 
provision of public subsidy to loss-making 
enterpr ises seek to es tabl ish that i t i s 
the public welfare, rather than private 
i n t e r e s t , which i s diminished by the 
subsidy; tha t , moreover, the subsidy 
a s s i s t s some privileged group a t the 
expense of the great majority of the 
population, many of whose members have 
incomes lower than those of the people 
that they are obliged to subsidise. 
The most immediate effect ( i t i s argued) 
i s tha t money has to be transferred from 
the taxpayer to the members of the 
subsidised work-force (which, i t should be 
understood, inc ludes managers and, 
sometimes, directors, as well as workers). 
I t i s naive to suppose that the major part 
of this burden on taxpayers will be borne 
by the well- to-do. No matter what the 
formal system of tax may be, the well-to-
do can afford (and are entitled) to obtain 
the advice of tax spec i a l i s t s , if they 
lack the knowledge themselves, on the most 
effective means of tax avoidance. I t i s 
possible that the burden of tax on the 
well-to-do i s higher than i s social ly 
desirable , but tha t i s a quite separate 
question. 
The second effect would be to ra ise the 
costs, or reduce the returns on businesses 
which would otherwise have achieved some 
measure of success but which fai l because 
of the addiional burden imposed upon them. 
The loss of actual or potential employment 
in these establishments may be greater 
than the number of jobs saved in the 
subsidised establishment. 
The third effect that might be evident in 
the fa i r ly short run i s encouragement to 
i n e r t i a . I n n o v a t i o n i s o f t e n 
uncomfortable, and if i t i s believed 
(a lbe i t incorrectly) tha t establishments 
which fail to take the steps to achieve an 
acceptable level of profitability will be 
p ro tec t ed from what should be the 
consequences of the i r behaviour, i t i s 
unlikely that either management or workers 
will display much enthusiasm for proposals 
which would expose them to uncertainty and 
inconvenience. 
The immediate loss suffered by the general 
p u b l i c as a consequence of t h e s e 
considerations may, however, be small 
compared with those eventually occasioned 
by f a i l u r e to take advantage of the 
i n e v i t a b l y imprec ise but r e l a t i v e l y 
e f f e c t i v e funct ion of the ' s igna l s* 
imparted by the market system. Consumers 
are able to provide real information about 
their preferences; producers provide (and 
obtain) information about the real costs 
of r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e p e r c e i v e d 
preferences. 
No sensible person supposes tha t the 
market provides perfect information, but 
in a world in which there i s inevitably a 
great deal of ignorance, and in which no 
more than very crude guesses about future 
prospects can be hazarded, the market 
provides more accurate information about 
what consumers want, and about the most 
effect ive ways of providing what they 
want, than any other source. 
The elimination of loss-making concerns is 
viewed by some as an essent ia l part of 
what may be called 'creative destruction'. 
Indeed, i t can be argued t h a t the 
'fundamental impulse ' of a dynamic 
capital is t economy, which i s the one best 
able (on h i s to r i ca l evidence) to achieve 
rising living standards for all sectors of 
the population, comes from the continuous 
introduction of new methods, new markets, 
and new organisations. Consequently, some 
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establishments which had previously been 
efficient and profitable no longer produce 
what i s required or f a i l to produce a t a 
cost that i s now acceptable. To shield 
the f a i l u r e s , i t i s argued, i s not merely 
to i n f l i c t a d i rec t cost upon the r e s t of 
the community but to drain the vi ta l fuel 
from the engine of growth. 
This argument (subsequently referred to as 
'Pure Market Argument' or PMA) tends in 
current Br i t i sh p o l i t i c a l debate to be 
thought of as ' r i gh t wing'. There are, 
perhaps, some implicit assumptions in the 
argument which might be of a 'right wing' 
nature, but there should be nothing in the 
general nature of the argument which would 
offend ' left wing* propensities - there i s 
no reason why s o c i a l i s t s should i n s i s t 
tha t workers in general are l ike ly to 
benefit from an arrangement which obliges 
working people to subsidise inef f ic ient 
performance. 
There are , however, grounds for rather 
more scepticism about the effectiveness of 
PMA than i s usually displayed by i t s 
protagonists (who do, as a matter of fact, 
tend to be ' r igh t wing'). Proponents of 
t h i s view are incl ined to t a lk as i f the 
clear record of economic performance i s 
entirely consistent with their explanation 
of behaviour. 
Evidence about what happens in the ' rea l 
world' i s far l e s s c lear cut. Careful 
s t u d i e s of i n d u s t r i a l performance in 
re la t ion to much less complex (and more 
easily measured) factors provide very few 
sure guides to the circumstances in which 
success i s achieved. I t might, then, seem 
reasonable to examine the conditions in 
which high rates of growth and development 
have rea l ly taken place. On doing t h i s , 
however, i t quickly becomes apparent that 
those economies which have achieved a high 
rate of growth have engaged in a great 
many interventionist act ivi t ies including 
var ious forms of p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t 
fore ign goods, and o ther government 
assistance to domestic industry. Japan, 
Germany, France and even the United States 
provide examples of dynamic growth which 
has been accompanied by high levels of 
government intervention in the market 
economy. 
Japan has often been ci ted as an example 
of a very successful economy, yet i s one 
which is characterised by a high degree of 
government intervention. The nature of 
the intervention may have been overstated 
by some commentators, and i t s implications 
misunders tood, but the monograph by 
Professor G C Allen, published by the 
Insti tute of Economic Affairs (How Japan 
Competes), a body unlikely to express 
undue enthusiasm for intervention, notes 
that "in the early years of reconstruction 
and in the period in which Japanese 
Shipbuilding attained predominance in the 
world, government subsidies, mainly in the 
form of low i n t e r e s t l oans , made an 
important contribution. Without this help 
the industry would probably have been 
unable to break into foreign markets, le t 
alone dominate them" (p28). 
Some forms of intervention have been less 
c l e a r l y succes s fu l . Both Japan and 
Germany have fe l t i t worth their while to 
provide (for example) s u b s t a n t i a l 
subsidies to their coal-mining industries. 
This may have been due in p a r t t o 
mis judgement about t h e p o t e n t i a l 
profitably of coal-mining, or i t may have 
reflected a desire to reduce the costs to 
members of the declining industry, but i t 
has been part of a 'package' which has, on 
the whole, been rather successful. 
I t i s argued by the protagonists of PMA 
that these economies would have been even 
more successfu l i f they had allowed 
greater scope to the free play of market 
forces. This may be so, but i t i s not 
self-evident . I t may be the case that 
some degree of p r o t e c t i o n from the 
a rb i t r a r ines s of market forces, which 
often are beyond the power of the labour 
force to influence, encourages a more co-
o p e r a t i v e d i s p o s i t i o n and g r e a t e r 
w i l l i n g n e s s t o accept t echno log ica l 
change. Protection i s quite c lear ly not 
enough by i t s e l f , but i t may be the case 
that the United Kingdom has been wrong, 
not so much in providing subsidies but in 
the nature of the 'package* in which they 
have been presented. Before developing 
this theme, however, i t might be useful to 
consider some of the circumstances in 
which subsidies are appropriate. 
There a r e two d i s t i n c t s e t s of 
circumstances in which a subsidy might be 
considered appropriate. One i s where 
there i s reason to believe that those who, 
directly or indirectly, are likely to bear 
the costs of the subsidy might be expected 
t o gain in the long run from the 
arrangement. The other i s where those who 
bear the costs wi l l be worse off, but 
where the effect on them is considered to 
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be o f f s e t in terms of some welfare 
c r i t e r i a by the gain to the d i r e c t 
benefic iar ies . The second case would, 
however, involve a highly contentious set 
of welfare judgements . I in tend , 
therefore, to concentrate on the f i r s t 
case. 
The simplest set of circumstances is where 
the cost of the subsidy would be l e s s 
than the unemployment (and r e l a t e d ) 
benefits paid to those who lose the i r 
jobs. When the loss of income due to 
redundancies has a significant multiplier 
effect (e.g. shopkeepers and others going 
out of business because they have los t 
their customers) the off-setting costs may 
be high re l a t ive to the subsidy. In 
normal circumstances, i t would be expected 
that the displaced workforce would find 
other jobs, possibly in conditions where 
the i r productivity would be higher, but 
with present high levels of unemployment 
the offset t ing costs would be l ikely to 
l a s t for a considerable length of time. 
If redundancy payments are high (as with 
the current terms offered to mineworkers 
for example), the costs to the rest of the 
community might well be substant ia l ly 
h igher in the near fu tu re than the 
subsidies required to maintain employment. 
In addition, where relocation of workers 
means that a large proportion of the local 
labour force has to move to another area, 
there wi l l be an addit ional cost in the 
form of homes, schools, c l in ics (for 
example) that must be replaced. Unless 
there i s spare capacity in the areas to 
which the workers (eventually) move, there 
will be additional costs to the community 
in providing replacements for the homes, 
schools and c l in i c s which have become 
derelict. 
The adherents of PMA will argue that costs 
w i l l r i s e in the a reas to which the 
(sometimes unhappy) migrants will go. So, 
i t will cost more to live in London. That 
might, eventually, make i t more attractive 
to l ive in Glasgow. In fact , however, a 
government ostensibly committed to PMA 
offers i t s own workers a bonus if they 
live in London, in order to meet the extra 
c o s t s t h a t a re a consequence of the 
migration tha t has taken place. Whether 
t h i s i s due t o incompe tence or 
disingenuity is a matter that will not be 
explored here. In e i ther case the costs 
wi l l be met by the same people who would 
have been obliged to pay the cost of the 
i n i t i a l subsidy. 
In addition to these consequences of the 
f a i l u r e of a firm or e s t ab l i shmen t , 
account must also be taken of any induced 
changes in the price of imported goods 
which replace domestic production. If 
resources (including labour) cannot be 
t r a n s f e r r e d f a i r l y quickly to o ther 
(equally or more) productive a c t i v i t i e s , 
there wi l l be an increased demand for 
imports. The consequent rise in the price 
of imports may impose a greater cost than 
that which would have been imposed by the 
cost of the subsidy. 
Advocates of the PMA approach are slow to 
recognise such costs . They are equally 
slow to recognise t h a t p o t e n t i a l l y 
productive establishments may fail to meet 
costs because of essent ia l ly short-run 
phenomena over which they have no control. 
During a period in which world trade i s 
depressed, firms which could prosper in 
be t te r (or even 'average*) conditions may 
be forced out of business. If the slump 
i s of s h o r t d u r a t i o n , i t may be 
practicable to 'reassemble' the ski l led 
workforce and set up in business once 
again. There does, however, seem to be 
reason to believe that during the past 
five years a not insubstantial section of 
B r i t i s h manufacturing has been l o s t 
permanently. 
Under such circumstances more substantial 
loss may occur as a consequence of large 
s c a l e l o n g - t e r m unemployment . A 
significant part of the prospective labour 
force may f a i l to acquire e i ther the 
s k i l l s or the i n d u s t r i a l d i s c i p l i n e 
required to enable them to make a useful 
contribution to the economic l i fe of their 
communities. If the proportion of local 
labour force in this condition rises above 
some cr i t ical level, the long term effect 
may be devastating. Entire communities 
become depressed areas; their populations 
embittered and al ienated, and if not a 
permanent charge on the r e s t of the 
community, at l eas t unlikely to make a 
s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n to general 
welfare. 
Awareness of the potent ia l costs of the 
PMA approach should not, however, lead to 
losing sight of the strong points of i t s 
case. I t i s important that the immensely 
valuable 'signalling' device of the market 
place should be able to operate, and that 
i t s s i g n a l s be understood; i t i s 
important that there should be incentives 
to improve productive performance and that 
resources should be encouraged to move 
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from less productive to more productive 
a c t i v i t i e s ; i t i s impor tan t t h a t 
p o l i t i c a l considerations (in terms of 
potent ia l votes in the next election) 
should be no more than (at most) a minor 
consideration in the determination of 
indus t r i a l s t ra tegy, and i t i s important 
t h a t t he r e should be few a r t i f i c i a l 
r e s t r a i n t s on o c c u p a t i o n a l and 
geographical mobility. 
The weakness of the more extreme versions 
of PMA i s that they r e s t on an impl ic i t 
assumption t h a t rap id adjustment i s 
p r a c t i c a b l e and do not d i s t i n g u i s h 
adequately between failure to meet short-
term d i f f i c u l t i e s (which may inc lude 
periods of five to seven years trade 
depression) and fundamental productive 
inefficiency. I t may, indeed be the case 
that dynamic establishments are more 
vulnerable to short-term effects than more 
conservative counterparts which have paid 
less a t ten t ion to improving productivity 
than to maintaining liquid reserves. 
I t i s undoubtedly true that there are 
considerable d i f f i c u l t i e s in deciding 
which loss-makers are suitable cases for 
t r e a t m e n t . B r i t i s h exper ience may, 
however, have been particularly unhappy in 
t h i s r e s p e c t because of a tendency, 
particularly with nationalised industries, 
to lump toge the r c o s t s due to q u i t e 
di f ferent , and sometimes confl ic t ing, 
objectives. As a consequence, i t i s often 
difficult to know what the real 'signals' 
a r e . There i s , f o r example , a 
considerable amount of disagreement among 
experts about the real operating losses of 
the Coal Board. 
At the same time, insufficient attention 
i s paid to pos i t ive action which would 
increase the mobility and adaptability of 
a labour force. There i s not space to 
develop this argument, and I will confine 
myself to one comment. Japan has a far 
higher p ropor t ion of i t s school age 
population in education to the age of 
eighteen, and has approximately five times 
as many engineering graduates per head of 
the population. 
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